Chapter #13

Intensity of inner work. A Visit to Finland. "Chief feature." "We have very little time. Final2 Version

The main ideas: 1.)Inner work, 2.)Ouspensky describes Gurdjieff's extraordinary powers, 3.)The story of our life and the difficulty of relaying it, 4.)The Chief Feature.
Richard Liebow said Natural acting is painful to watch, because acting is not natural. When it doesn't work it becomes very painful to watch especially in films. Richard used to say "Acting is lying, but good acting is not." In addition, Richard continually talked about intentionality.
Objectives: Try to get a glimps of your "Chief Fault" sometimes refered to as Chief Feature.

*The Nine Personality Types (I'm not sure where I got this table*
Type Number Fault	The Perfectionist One anger	The Giver Two pride	The Performer Three deceit	The Romantic Four envy	The Observer Five avarice	The Trooper Six fear	The Epicure Seven gluttony	The Boss Eight lust	The Mediator Nine sloth

Outline Points
Intensity of inner work. Preparation for "facts." A visit to Finland. The "miracle" begins. Mental "conversations" with G. "You are not asleep." Seeing "sleeping people." Impossibility of investigating higher phenomena by ordinary means. A changed outlook on "methods of action." "Chief feature." Mr. G. once again brings up the major issue of "chief feature" or sometimes referred to us as Chief Fault. According to Gurdjieff, each of us is formed around something he called the Chief Feature, the organizing principle of our personality and a primary obstacle to awakening. This is our main characteristic, an overall pattern coloring all our behavior, which is often perfectly obvious to our friends and family but - no matter how many times we're told about it - is entirely opaque to us. It's our most obvious feature - and we're numb to it! No matter how supposedly introverted we are, the likelihood is we know ourselves scarcely at all. Our buffer-hidden contradictions, our mechanicality, our self-concealment - these phenomena could explain a great deal of our swept-along, baffling and violent lives. G. defines people's chief feature. Reorganization of the group. Those who leave the work. Sitting between two stools. Difficulty of coming back. G.'s apartment. Reaction to silence. "Seeing lies." A demonstration. How to awake. How to create the emotional state necessary. Three ways. The necessity of sacrifice. "Sacrificing one's suffering." Expanded table of hydrogens. A "moving diagram." A new discovery. "We have very little time."

For our review of the content of Chapter Thirteen we address some of these questions DEveloped by Richard Liebow:

Do you have any interest in learning how to carry on telepathic conversations with other human beings?
Do you have any interest in learning how to foretell your future?
Do you know your future?
Do you ever find yourself sitting between two stools?
Do you sometimes seek out the friendship of people who support your weaknesses?
Do you deliberately seek out associations with individuals who tend to strengthen your strengths?
Are you forming the habit of listening to your own voice and hearing intonations which may suggest that sometimes you really do not know what you are talking about?
Do you have any interest in accessing the emotional state of mind that may tend to carry you into some wonderful new state of human experience?
Do you find that you are able to learn and master skills by striving to teach them to others?
Do you ever find yourself thinking that you really have very little time?
When you are with other people, do you feel compelled to talk?
How do you organize and direct the internal chatter of your mind into positive constructive channels?
Are you beginning to understand that with the heightened sensitivity and receptivity that comes as a result of work on oneself--there comes also a delicacy that exposes one's nerves and one's feelings to extreme unimaginable levels of anguish and pain?
Are you still victimized by the illusion that you can acquire the new without giving up the old?
Regarding this system of ideas: Do you feel that you can accept parts of it, and reject other parts of it?
Are you beginning to acquire an informed sense of the true meaning of the concept of sacrifice?
Is there any change in your outlook on methods of action?
Are you becoming more convinced that violent means never really accomplish anything?
Do you ever catch yourself blaming others in order to feel that you are in the right?
Have you ever told someone a secret in strict confidence--only to find yourself betrayed?

Notes:
Edmund Husserl(1859-1938)He thought to be the father of phenomenology. Born in the former Checkoslovakia, Husserl studied in Leipzig, Berlin and Vienna, where he also taught. He began his studies as a mathemetician, but his studies were influenced by Brentano, who moved him to study more psychology and philosophy. He wrote his first book in 1891, The Philosophy of Arithmetic. This book dealt mostly with mathematical issues, but his interests soon shifted. Husserl immersed himself in the study of logic from 1890-1900, and he soon after produced another text: Logical Investigations(1901).
Some of his major ideas of this era were intentionality, relations, and identity of things. He came to focus on perceptual experience, and as he began to shed his early Kantian ways, he wrote Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy(1913). His last three books were Formal and Transcendental Logic(1929), Cartesian Meditations(1931), and Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness(1928),a group of lectures he compiled and edited. His lectures and essays comprise a large amount of his works.
Husserl attempted to shift the focus of philosophy away from large scale theorization, towards a more precise study of discrete phenomena, ideas and simple events. He was interested in the essential structure of things, using eidetic analysis of intentionality to yield apodictic(necessary) truths.
Husserl aided philosophy, breaking the Cartesian trap of dualism with new ideas like intentionality. He was perhaps the most important force in revitalizing 20th century continental philosophy.

Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), German philosopher, who developed existential phenomenology and has been widely regarded as the most original 20th-century philosopher. He studied Roman Catholic theology and then philosophy at the University of Freiburg, where he was a student of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. Heidegger began teaching at Freiburg in 1915. After teaching (1923-28) at Marburg, he became a professor of philosophy at Freiburg in 1928. He died in Messkirch on May 26, 1976.
The following information about isfrom Microsoft Encartais and it is his most important work . "Being and Time" h Besides Husserl, Heidegger was especially influenced by pre-Socratics, by the Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard, and by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. In his most important and influential work, Being and Time (1927; trans. 1962), Heidegger was concerned with what he considered the essential philosophical (and human) question: What is it, to be? This led to the question of what kind of "being" human beings have. They are, he said, thrown into a world that they have not made but that consists of potentially useful things, including cultural as well as natural objects. Because these objects and artifacts come to humanity from the past and are used in the present for the sake of future goals, Heidegger posited a fundamental relation between the mode of being of objects and of humanity and the structure of time. The individual is, however, always in danger of being submerged in the world of objects, everyday routine, and the conventional, shallow behavior of the crowd. The feeling of dread (Angst) brings the individual to a confrontation with death and the ultimate meaninglessness of life, but only in this confrontation can an authentic sense of Being and of freedom be attained. The first Introduction formulates the question to be asked: "What is the meaning of Being." Important orientation: Heidegger will seek to gain access to the meaning of Being as such by interpreting a particular being viz., Human Being. In consequence of this, the central task in Being and Time will be to gain access to the meaning of Human Being (Dasein). And this will form our main interest viz., the Dasein Analytic. The second Introduction describes the method Heidegger will use to uncover the meaning of human Being. That method will be phenomenology. Indeed, the 'phenomenon' of phenomenology will turn out to be the Being of the being that is to be investigated. We will attempt a phenomenological interpretation of everyday human existence in order to uncover the ground for the possibilities of everyday human existence. The investigation will be ontological in nature. Now let me give you an indication of what I mean by this. Suppose the concept of freedom then: Particular acts such as walking to the store, etc. can be viewed as occurring on an 'ontic level' whereas the nature of Human Freedom would underlie these actions on the 'ontological level.' Thus the ontological structure of Freedom becomes the ground for the possibility of all particular (ontic) manifestations of freedom. Now, this ontological structure is the kind of structure that Heidegger wants to get at--he wants, in the Dasein Analytic, to uncover the fundamental structures of Human existence. Furthermore, in our example of Freedom, we ca say that the structure of Freedom is peculiar to human beings and not to things. This distinction between structures that pertain to Human Being and not to other kinds of beings, this distinction is what lies behind a distinction Heidegger will make between existentials and categories. Thus, in our example, 'Freedom' would be and existential while, say, 'hardness' (which pertains to 'things') would be a category. So we can say that Heidegger in the Dasein Analytic wants to uncover the existential structures of Human existence. In the chapters immediately following the 'introductions,' Heidegger begins the analysis of what it means to be human, he begins the uncovering of the Being of Human Being. Indeed, the entire published part of the thesis is devoted to uncovering the fundamental structures of Human Being. Chapter 1 Heidegger begins the chapter with two general statements: (1) Dasein is in each case mine (i.e., each one of us is a human being) (2) The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its Existenz (Existenz here to be taken in a dynamic, active, future oriented sense). Now these two characteristics of Dasein are unified in two modes of Existenz: (a)authentic (eigentliche) existence (b) inauthentic (uneigentliche) existence What this means can be seen in Heidegger p. 68. This means that there are two ways in which human beings can 'take up' their existence (for in each case it is their existence) viz. either as their own (authenticity) or, in some sense, as not their own (inauthenticity). For instance (i) a person who realizes that they are choosing their life style or (ii) a person who is simply fulfilling a pre-designed role in their society, family, peer group etc. Both people exist and both people have an existence that is theirs but the former involves an element of choice that is not clearly present in the latter. Now, here's where Chapter 1 leads into the beginning of the analysis: Heidegger then asks, what is the most general structure in which human beings exist--authentically or inauthentically. And he sees this general structure in the 'empirical,' ontic level of average everydayness. This average everydayness thus forms the starting point for the interpretation of Dasein. This level has, as its fundamental structure, Being-in-the-world. It is a unitary structure which must be seen as a whole. Yet, if we bear this in mind, it is methodologically possible to 'divide' it into different parts and levels. (It is these 'parts and levels' of Being-in-the-world that are explained in Chapters 2-5.) Ch 2: preliminary discussion Ch 3: 'in-the-world': discloses 'the worldhood of the world' (emphasizes the structures of 'things'). Ch 4: the 'who' of that entity which exists 'in-the-world': (discusses our relation with others) Ch 5: 'steps back' and seeks a deeper understanding of the structures involved in Being-in-the-world (viz., Being-in as such). Chapter 2 is devoted to a preliminary discussion of Being-in. Dasein is not 'in' the world as, for instance, water is 'in' a glass i.e., as objects stand to objects, one 'inside' the other. Rather, Being-in is an existential and as such is characteristic of Dasein. It is best described as dwelling alongside, as tarrying along. Dasein comports itself concernfully within the world. Again, Dasein is engaged in the activities of its everyday life--Being-in-the-world denotes Dasein's concernful being alongside entities and tarrying with others. This is the primary mode in which Dasein is in the world. As a corollary, Heidegger contrasts this primary mode with a derivative (founded) mode which he calls knowing the world. In this peculiar way of comportment to the world, I dis-engage myself from my concernful comportment and 'change my attitude' toward the world. I tend to 'focus in' on something as an object Take for example, the handling of a piece of chalk: (1) I can engage in use which teaching or (2) step back from its use and talk about it', even starting to describe it ('know it') as white, an inch or so long, etc. This shift in comportment will have great significance, it will affect the attitude one can take towards Human Being. In chapter 3, Heidegger looks more closely at one's dealings with the world, he looks specifically at the 'in-the-world'. From this the interpretation uncovers that our primary comportment to 'entities' within the world is one of use. I am, proximately and for the most part, engaged with 'things' in terms of an equipmental totality. Entities, seen from their aspect of use, are called 'ready-to-hand' (Zuhanden). However, entities, when they become disengaged from our use with them become merely 'present-at-hand' (Vorhanden). Think of the distinction between (1) using a pencil and (2) having the pencil break -- and just staring at it. Now, these two ways of describing entities become, for Heidegger, the two ways of categorizing 'things'. Again, though, our primary relationship to entities within the world is in the mode of their being ready-to-hand. And it is with this that a sense of the worldhood of the world emerges as Dasein's totality of involvement's with things ready-to-hand. [Think, for instance, of the 'world' of a carpenter and of how much of that world is 'signified' by the referential totality of involvements that he/she would have to the equipmental totality around them (and how that world might be different from the 'world' of a mathematician).] Chapter 4 devotes itself to an uncovering of the 'who' of this Dasein who understandingly comports itself towards its everyday activities and involvements. Heidegger wants to investigate the sense of the self manifest for the most part in everyday existence. His brilliant analysis comes to the startling conclusion that proximately and for the most part, everyday Dasein has no 'self' of its own. One's sense of self, of what one is to do, of how one is to live: this, for the most part, is given from the outside-- Heidegger characterizes this as the they-world, or simply as the they (Das Man). The 'who' of everyday Dasein is Das Man. (cf. page 164) Chapter 5 Being-in as such Now at this stage Heidegger stops the ongoing analysis and 'steps back' in order to attempt a more primordial interpretation of what has so far been said -- the interpretation is going to seek a deeper understanding of Being-in-the-world. And it is going to do so by uncovering certain fundamental structures in Dasein itself (as opposed to 'things' and 'others'). Chapter 5 is to investigate Being-in as such. The analysis discloses two fundamental moments that are always present in Dasein and, for the most part, are involved in a third moment. Let's look at these 'moments', these existential structures of Dasein's Existenz: (1) Befindlichkeit ('How one finds oneself') This expresses the 'fact' that Dasein always finds itself in a situation. Heidegger uses the expression throwness (Geworfenheit). Dasein is 'thrown' in a world (most radically at birth) and is always already in a world. (a) Concrete manifestation of Befindlichkeit. As a specific mode of Befindlichkeit, Heidegger points out the sense of moods (Stimmung). Moods can somehow disclose 'how we are' or 'how we find ourselves', they manifest a peculiar attunment to existence (this 'power' of moods to disclose will lead Heidegger to his famous discussion of anxiety). (2) Verstehen ('Understanding') This is expressive of Dasein's active comportment towards possibilities, projects. Heidegger says that they understanding is altogether permeated with possibilities (Dasein is always confronted with the 'possible') (Note: understanding is not a 'mental state' nor is 'possibility' to be seen in terms of 'actual possibilities,' rather it is the ground for the 'possibility of possibilities') (a) Specific mode of Verstehen Now Heidegger writes that the 'projecting' of the understanding has its own possibility--that of developing 'itself'. Such a self-developing of the understanding Heidegger calls interpretation. From this we can see how Dasein has the peculiar possibility of understanding itself, of engaging in a self-interpretation. That is to say, of engaging in a 'project' like that put forth in this present treatise: The Dasein Analytic is engaged in an interpretation, a self-understanding of Human Being. Now, these two movements (Befindlichkeit and Verstehen) constitute the essential unity of Dasein's basic state. They are never wholly separate from one another: (pg. 188) "By way of having a mood, Dasein 'sees' possibilities, in terms of which it is. In the projective disclosure of such possibilities, it already has a mood in every case". Now, these two movements are, for the most part, unthematically present in a third movement which Heidegger calls: (3) Verfallen (Fallenness) This expresses Dasein's average everydayness--Dasein's immersion in the world of its everyday concerns and projects. This is the level at which the moments of Befindlichkeit and Verstehen usually operate. Thus we have the three 'movements': Dasein finds itself in a situation, comports itself to possibilities and does so for the most part in its everyday concerns and activities. Chapter 6 But these three movements are not, so to speak, radically separate from one another--Heidegger has 'stepped back' to analyze them, but he is analyzing a unitary phenomenon: Dasein's existence is a unity. Now, Heidegger calls the unity of this unitary structure Care (Sorge). And he says, in chapter 6, that 'Care" is the Being of Dasein, the Nature of Human Being (it is that fundamental structure that underlies each and every particular human existence). Being and Time p. 237 The Being of Dasein (i.e., Care) is: ahead-of-itself/being-already-in-(the world)/as being-alongside-entities (and caring-for-others) The ahead-of-itself refers to the structural moment of Verstehen, it expresses Dasein's comportment towards possibilities (in the philosophical tradition: Transcendence--this expresses the deeper structure of Freedom, which the later Heidegger expresses by "Openness"). The being-already-in-the-world refers to the structural moment of Befindlichkeit and indicates the factual situation that always surrounds a human being. Dasein is always thrown into a situation that is, is some sense, already there. And this means that Dasein is not the ground (or cause) of the situation--in fact, the situation becomes the ground upon which Dasein 'finds itself'. (The philosophical tradition speaks of this as finitude). Now, these two 'moments' in Dasein's Being are for the most part, imperceptibly 'at work' in Dasein's everyday activities and concerns. They are acted out in the presence of one's being-alongside-entities (and caring for others). And this Heidegger has referred to as the structural moment of Verfallen. **** With this, the Being of Human Being is disclosed. The first division closes with a very important reflection on the nature of truth--a reflection designed to show that the disclosures thus made are not merely 'Heidegger's thought' but rather are uncoverings of 'the things themselves.' **** Second Division It is here that the notion of Being and the notion of Time are brought together. Heidegger has called the 1st division a "Preparatory Analysis"--here this analysis receives its completion: We have said that the Care-structure expresses the Being of Dasein, the meaning of Human Being. But if we look closely at this care-structure, we can see something perhaps even deeper than these moments themselves, something that seems to lie behind even these fundamental structure, something which grounds their inner unity and makes them possible. That which grounds the unity of the care-structure i.e., that grounds the Being-of-Dasein, the Being of Human Being, is Temporality (Zeitlichkeit). In Aristotelian terms, we could say that Time is the form of human life. Each structural moment manifests what Heidegger calls a temporal ecstasy: The ahead of itself manifests the futural. The already in a world manifests the 'past' (or the having been). The being alongside manifests the 'present' actualization of the other two moments. (We reach out towards the future while taking up our past thus yielding our present activities. Note how the future--and hence the aspect of possibility--has priority over the other two moments.) **** I should mention that it is in this second division that he carries out his famous analysis of "that possibility which is our ownmost possibility," namely Death. One final note on this 'overview' will lead us into the first page of the text. We now have an indication of the relation between temporality and the Being of Dasein (Human Being is thoroughly temporal). It is this connection between temporality and human existence that gives rise to Heidegger's discussion of History. 'How we find ourselves' expresses the fact that we are thrown into a 'world' already there before us -- this is most evident in the radical sense of Birth. Hence, one is literally 'thrown into a world' beyond one's control -- but this 'world' is not merely a particular environment -- it has its place in history: one is, broadly speaking, thrown into a historical moment. Now, 'historical moments' are not isolated moments, but rather involve a 'carrying forth' of history. A certain tradition gets 'passed down' and 'taken over' (in its own fashion) in every epoch. The past, in some sense, gets taken up in the present -- though often in a manner in which its character as past gets forgotten and covered over. With this in mind, Heidegger writes (p. 43): "Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial 'sources' from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand." Now this provides the clue for the kind of beginning that Heidegger makes in the treatise -- in a sense, through the final reflections on history, the whole work has begun to bend back upon itself -- and it shows the necessity of beginning at 'the origins' of a problem. Copyright: Robert Cavalier Department of Philosophy / Carnegie Mellon University

Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) Born to a mother from a local farming community and a jurist father. He showed an early interest in philosophy, but his father's experience with the legal system undoubtedly influenced his decision to study law at university. It soon became clear that Jaspers did not particularly enjoy law, and he switched to studying medicine in 1902. Jaspers graduated from medical school in 1909 and began work at a psychiatric hospital in Heidelberg where Emil Kraepelin had worked some years earlier. Jaspers became dissatisfied with the way the medical community of the time approached the study of mental illness and set himself the task of improving the psychiatric approach. In 1913 Jaspers gained a temporary post as a psychology teacher at Heidelberg University. The post later became permanent, and Jaspers never returned to clinical practice. At the age of 40 Jaspers turned from psychology to philosophy, expanding on themes he had developed in his psychiatric works. He became a renowned philosopher, well respected in Germany and Europe. In 1948 Jaspers moved to the University of Basel in Switzerland. He remained prominent in the philosophical community until his death in Basel in 1969.
Most commentators associate Jaspers with the philosophy of existentialism, in part because he draws largely upon the existentialist roots of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, and in part because the theme of individual freedom permeates his work.[citation needed] In Philosophy (3 vols, 1932), Jaspers gave his view of the history of philosophy and introduced his major themes. Beginning with modern science and empiricism, Jaspers points out that as we question reality, we confront borders that an empirical (or scientific) method can simply not transcend. At this point, the individual faces a choice: sink into despair and resignation, or take a leap of faith toward what Jaspers calls Transcendence. In making this leap, individuals confront their own limitless freedom, which Jaspers calls Existenz, and can finally experience authentic existence. Transcendence (paired with the term The Encompassing in later works) is, for Jaspers, that which exists beyond the world of time and space. Jaspers' formulation of Transcendence as ultimate non-objectivity (or no-thing-ness) has led many philosophers to argue that ultimately, Jaspers became a monist, though Jaspers himself continually stressed the necessity of recognizing the validity of the concepts both of subjectivity and of objectivity. Although he rejected explicit religious doctrines, including the notion of a personal God, Jaspers influenced contemporary theology through his philosophy of transcendence and the limits of human experience. Mystic Christian traditions influenced Jaspers himself tremendously, particularly those of Meister Eckhart and of Nicholas of Cusa. He also took an active interest in Eastern philosophies, particularly Buddhism, and developed the theory of an Axial Age, a period of substantial philosophical and religious development. Jaspers also entered public debates with Rudolf Bultmann, wherein Jaspers roundly criticized Bultmann's "demythologizing" of Christianity. Jaspers also wrote extensively on the threat to human freedom posed by modern science and modern economic and political institutions. During World War II, he had to abandon his teaching post because his wife was Jewish. After the war he resumed his teaching position, and in his work The Question of German Guilt he unabashedly examined the culpability of Germany as a whole in the atrocities of Hitler's Third Reich. Jaspers' major works, lengthy and detailed, can seem daunting in their complexity. His last great attempt at a systematic philosophy of Existenz � Von Der Wahrheit (On Truth) � has not yet appeared in English. However, he also wrote accessible and entertaining shorter works, most notably Philosophy is for Everyman. Commentators often compare Jaspers' philosophy to that of his contemporary, Martin Heidegger. Indeed, both sought to explore the meaning of being (Sein) and existence (Dasein). While the two did maintain a brief friendship, their relationship deteriorated - due in part to Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazi party, but also due to the (probably over-emphasized) philosophical differences between the two. The two major proponents of phenomenological hermeneutics, Paul Ricoeur (a student of Jaspers) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (Jaspers' successor at Heidelberg) both display Jaspers' influence in their works. Other important work appeared in Philosophy and Existence (1938). For Jaspers, the term "existence" ( Existenz) designates the indefinable experience of freedom and possibility; an experience which constitutes the authentic being of individuals who become aware of "the encompassing" by confronting suffering, conflict, guilt, chance, and death.

Maurice Marleau-Ponty
(1908 � 1961) was a French phenomenological philosopher, strongly influenced by Karl Marx, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger in addition to being closely associated with Jean-Paul Sartre (who later stated he had been "converted" to Marxism by Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir. At the core of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is a sustained argument for the foundational role that perception plays in understanding the world as well as engaging with the world. Like the other major phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty expressed his philosophical insights in writings on art, literature, linguistics, and politics. He was the only major phenomenologist of the first half of the twentieth century to engage extensively with the sciences and especially with descriptive psychology. Because of this engagement his writings have become influential in the recent project of naturalizing phenomenology, in which phenomenologists use the results of psychology and cognitive science.

Glossary: Germain phenomenology:A 20th-century philosophical movement dedicated to describing the structures of experience as they present themselves to consciousness, without recourse to theory, deduction, or assumptions from other disciplines such as the natural sciences.the task of phenomenology is to study essences, such as the essence of emotions. Although Husserl himself never gave up his early interest in essences, he later held that only the essences of certain special conscious structures are the proper object of phenomenology. As formulated by Husserl after 1910, phenomenology is the study of the structures of consciousness that enable consciousness to refer to objects outside itself. This study requires reflection on the content of the mind to the exclusion of everything else. Husserl called this type of reflection the phenomenological reduction. Because the mind can be directed toward nonexistent as well as real objects, Husserl noted that phenomenological reflection does not presuppose that anything exists, but rather amounts to a �bracketing of existence,� that is, setting aside the question of the real existence of the contemplated object.
What Husserl discovered when he contemplated the content of his mind were such acts as remembering, desiring, and perceiving and the abstract content of these acts, which Husserl called meanings. These meanings, he claimed, enabled an act to be directed toward an object under a certain aspect; and such directedness, called intentionality, he held to be the essence of consciousness. Transcendental phenomenology, according to Husserl, was the study of the basic components of the meanings that make intentionality possible. Later, in Cartesian Meditations (1931; trans. 1960), he introduced genetic phenomenology, which he defined as the study of how these meanings are built up in the course of experience. Heidegger also a phenomenologists follow Husserl in attempting to use pure description. Thus, they all subscribe to Husserl's slogan �To the things themselves.� They differ among themselves, however, as to whether the phenomenological reduction can be performed, and as to what is manifest to the philosopher giving a pure description of experience. The German philosopher Martin Heidegger, Husserl's colleague and most brilliant critic, claimed that phenomenology should make manifest what is hidden in ordinary, everyday experience. He thus attempted in Being and Time (1927; trans. 1962) to describe what he called the structure of everydayness, or being-in-the-world, which he found to be an interconnected system of equipment, social roles, and purposes. Because, for Heidegger, one is what one does in the world, a phenomenological reduction to one's own private experience is impossible; and because human action consists of a direct grasp of objects, it is not necessary to posit a special mental entity called a meaning to account for intentionality. For Heidegger, being thrown into the world among things in the act of realizing projects is a more fundamental kind of intentionality than that revealed in merely staring at or thinking about objects, and it is this more fundamental intentionality that makes possible the directness analyzed by Husserl.
French Phenomenology: The French existentialist Jean Paul Sartre attempted to adapt Heidegger's phenomenology to the philosophy of consciousness, thereby in effect returning to Husserl. He agreed with Husserl that consciousness is always directed at objects but criticized his claim that such directedness is possible only by means of special mental entities called meanings. The French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty rejected Sartre's view that phenomenological description reveals human beings to be pure, isolated, and free consciousnesses. He stressed the role of the active, involved body in all human knowledge, thus generalizing Heidegger's insights to include the analysis of perception. Like Heidegger and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty is an existential phenomenologist, in that he denies the possibility of bracketing existence. Phenomenology has had a pervasive influence on 20th-century thought. Phenomenological versions of theology, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, and literary criticism have been developed, and phenomenology remains one of the most important schools of contemporary philosophy. English and American phenomenologyst:
Expanded table of hydrogens:
A "moving diogram":
Obsticuls Lying: prevents or hinders progress
Imagination:
Unnecessary Talking:
Negative Emotions:
buffer-hidden:
real I: It doesn't really exist
Additional Notes:
Window of opportunity
The moving center must take over so we don't have to think about it. You must validate everything otherwise it is just hot air.
Nature isn't tidy
News is junk food
Tolstoy,"The Anatomy of Fate" by Zev ben Shimon Halevi and The "Enneagram" by Helen Palmer.
according to J.G.Benet it is possible that at the spring of 1920, G. meets RS (Rudolf Steiner).

Chapter #13

Intensity of inner work. A Visit to Finland. "Chief feature." "We have very little time. Final2 Version

Outline Points